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UNBALANCED RESPONSES TO EMPLOYERS
GETTING EVEN: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
WHAT CONSTITUTES A TITLE VII-PROHIBITED
RETALIATORY ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
Shannon Vincentt
I. ESTABLISHING A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF IMPERMISSIBLE EMPLOYER
RETALIATION UNDER TITLE VII
A. Plaintiff's Prima Facie Case
Title VII protects employees' engaged in equal employment
opportunity proceedings or activities from employer
2 retaliation. Under
t J.D., 2005, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2002, Willamette
University.
1. Title VII identifies employees that are entitled to Title VII protections:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except
that the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in
any State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or
any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an
appointee on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the
exercise of the constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption set
forth in the preceding sentence shall not include employees subject to the civil
service laws of a State government, governmental agency or political
subdivision. With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term
includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2000).
2. Title VII identifies employers that may be held liable for Title VII violations:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of
twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and
any agent of such a person, but such term does not include (1) the United States,
a corporation wholly owned by the Government of the United States, an Indian
tribe, or any department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by statute
to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in section 2102 of Title 5),
or (2) a bona fide private membership club (other than a labor organization)
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Title VII, it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of [its employees because they] opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because
[they] made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VH]." 3 Title VII carves
out a legal cause of action for employees who believe that they were
impermissibly retaliated against because they engaged in Title VII-
protected activities.
In order to establish a prima facie case of Title VII-prohibited
employer retaliation, a plaintiff employee must show that (1) he or she
engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) his or her employer
subjected him or her to an adverse employment action, and (3) "a causal
link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. ' '4 When a
plaintiff employee establishes a prima facie case of Title VII-prohibited
employer retaliation, the burden of production shifts to the defendant
employer "to advance legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for any adverse
actions taken against" the plaintiff employee.' If the defendant employer
advances legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its adverse employment
action or actions, then the plaintiff employee "has the ultimate burden of
showing that [the defendant employer's] proffered reasons are pretextual." 6
B. Adverse Employment Action Standard
Circuits are split three ways as to what constitutes an adverse
employment action sufficient to sustain a Title VII-prohibited employer
retaliation case; consequently, a plaintiff employee's ability to establish the
second prong of his or her prima facie case depends on where his or her
case is brought. The three-way split is significant because a circuit's
reading of "adverse employment action" ultimately determines whether or
not a plaintiff employee's claim of Title VII-prohibited employer
retaliation is colorable in a court of law. Briefly, the three adverse
employment action standards include '(1) a lenient interpretation of what
employer conduct constitutes an adverse employment action, (2) a strict
interpretation of what employer conduct constitutes an adverse
employment action, and (3) an intermediate interpretation of what
employer conduct constitutes an adverse employment action.
which is exempt from taxation under section 501(c) of Title 26 ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
4. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000).
5. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1465.
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1. The Most Lenient Adverse Employment Action Standard
Adopted by the First,7 Seventh,8 Ninth,
9 Tenth,'0 Eleventh," and
D.C.' 2 Circuits, the most lenient adverse employment action standard has a
broad scope. Under the most lenient adverse employment action standard,
"a wide array of disadvantageous changes in the workplace [may]
constitute adverse employment actions.'
3 Since the standard is liberal, a
plaintiff employee can establish the second prong of his or her prima facie
case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation without having to show
that the adverse employment action he or she suffered was an ultimate
7. See, e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that
"employer actions such as demotions, disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to
promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and toleration of harassment by other
employees" may constitute adverse employment actions).
8. See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that an
employer may be held liable for retaliation if it puts "the complainant in a more unfriendly
working environment [with] actions like moving the person from a spacious, brightly lit
office to a dingy closet, depriving the person of previously available support services (like
secretarial help or a desktop computer), or cutting off challenging assignments.").
9. See, e.g., Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1237 (holding that the plaintiff employee
"suffered cognizable adverse employment actions when his employer [in response to his
Title VII-protected activity] eliminated employee meetings, eliminated its flexible starting
time policy, instituted a 'lockdown' of the workplace, and cut [his] salary.").
10. See, e.g., Comeveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir.
1996) (finding that the plaintiff employee "met the second step [in proving her prima facie
case of retaliation] by showing that shortly after she filed the charge against [her employer]
it required her to go through several hoops in order to obtain her severance benefits.");
Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that "malicious
prosecution [by a former employer] can constitute adverse employment action.").
11. See, e.g., Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1455-57 (11th Cir.
1998) (holding that the plaintiff employee "presented sufficient evidence to establish a
prima facie case of retaliation" because the defendant employer required her to work
without a lunch break, gave her a one-day suspension, solicited other employees for
negative statements about her, changed her schedule without notification, made negative
comments about her, and needlessly delayed authorizing medical treatment).
12. See, e.g., Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 330-31 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(holding that the defendant employer's cancellation of a public event honoring the plaintiff
employee was an adverse employment action under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA), which has an anti-retaliation provision parallel to that in Title VII, because:
the statute does not limit its reach only to acts of retaliation that take the form of
cognizable employment actions such as discharge, transfer or demotion. As we
have held in connection with Title VII's anti-retaliation provision, "to establish
a prima facie case . . . [a plaintiff employee need only show] that the
employer ... engaged in conduct having an adverse impact on the plaintiff. .
(alterations after bracketed material in original) (citations omitted).
13. Henderson, 217 F.3d at 1240. See cases cited supra notes 7-12 for examples of
disadvantageous changes in the workplace that constitute Title VII-prohibited adverse
employment actions under the most lenient adverse employment action standard.
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employment decision. 14 In other words, the lenient circuits extend "Title
VII's protection against retaliatory discrimination... to adverse actions
which fall short of ultimate employment decisions."'5 Of the three adverse
employment action standards, the most lenient is also the most widely
accepted.
2. The Most Restrictive Adverse Employment Action Standard
Adopted by the Fourth, 6 Fifth, 17 and Eighth'8 Circuits, the most
restrictive adverse employment action standard has a narrow scope. Under
the most restrictive adverse employment action standard, only ultimate
employment decisions are permitted into the employer retaliation calculus.
The circuits adopting this narrow view maintain that "Title VII was
designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every
decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential
effect upon those ultimate decisions."' 9  Since the standard is strict, a
plaintiff employee can establish the second prong of his or her prima facie
case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation only by showing that the
employer's adverse employment action was an ultimate employment
decision. Ultimate employment decisions include five employer actions:
(1) firings, (2) refusals to hire, (3) refusals to grant leave, (4) failures to
promote, and (5) changes in employee compensation. °
14. Although no test has been articulated as to what constitutes an "ultimate
employment decision," "ultimate employment decisions" are usually narrowly construed to
include only "'obvious end-decisions [such] as those to hire, to promote, etc."' Christopher
M. Courts, Note, An Adverse Employment Action-Not Just an Unfriendly Place to Work:
Co-Worker Retaliatory Harassment Under Title VII, 87 IOWA L. REV. 235, 243 (2001)
(alteration in original) (quoting Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981)).
15. Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456.
16. See, e.g., Pueschel v. Slater, No. 97-2503, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2467, at *5 (4th
Cir. Feb. 18, 1999) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer
because discussion of a change in the plaintiff employee's schedule was not the kind of final
adverse employment action required for a Title VII claim).
17. See, e.g., Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the defendant employer's rejection of the plaintiff employee's "purely lateral
transfer" request did not constitute a sufficient adverse employment action); Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding that the plaintiff employee
failed to establish an ultimate adverse employment action-showing "[h]ostility from fellow
employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety" was not enough to establish the
second prong of her prima facie case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation).
18. See, e.g., Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer because although the plaintiff
employee showed that she lost status and prestige when her staff was reassigned after her
Title VII-protected activity, she did not establish "that she suffered an adverse employment
action that affected the terms or conditions of her employment.").
19. Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995).
20. See id. at 782 (listing "hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
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3. The Intermediate Adverse Employment Action Standard
Adopted by the Second21 and Third
22 Circuits, the intermediate
adverse employment action standard is more restrictive than the most
lenient adverse employment action standard and more lenient than the most
restrictive adverse employment action standard. Under the intermediate
adverse employment action standard:
Retaliatory conduct other than discharge or refusal to rehire is...
proscribed by Title VII only if it alters the employee's
"compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,"
deprives him or her of "employment opportunities," or "adversely
affects his [or her] status as an employee." It follows that "not
everything that makes an employee unhappy" qualifies as
retaliation, for "[o]therwise, minor and even trivial employment
actions that 'an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did not
like would form the basis of a discrimination 
suit.',,23
In short, adverse employment actions that materially affect either a term or
condition of employment support Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation
claims under the intermediate adverse employment action standard.
C. An Alternative Approach
This Comment both articulates and argues in favor of an alternative
adverse employment action standard. This Comment's proposed adverse
employment action standard is (1) easier for employers to construct their
employment policies around than the most lenient standard, (2) more
protective of the employee rights that Title VII was designed to protect
compensating" as examples of ultimate employment decisions (citing Page v. Bolger, 645
F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981))).
21. See, e.g., Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997) (affirming summary
judgment for the defendant employer because the plaintiff employee's superiors' requests
that she drop her Title VII-protected charges were not enough to establish "that she suffered
Ia materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment."'); Wanamaker v.
Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 466-67 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that "the loss of an
office and phone by an employee who has already been informed of a termination decision,
and is waiting out his numbered days on the payroll searching for a new job, does not, in
and of itself, amount to adverse employment action.").
22. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1301 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the plaintiff employee's "allegations that she was subjected to 'unsubstantiated
oral reprimands' and 'unnecessary derogatory comments' following her complaint do not
rise to the level of the 'adverse employment action' required for a retaliation claim.").
23. Id. at 1300 (alteration in original) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437,
441 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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than the most restrictive and intermediate standards, and (3) consistent with
Title VII's purpose. Before presenting an alternative approach to the
circuit split over what employer conduct constitutes a Title VII-prohibited
adverse employment action, this Comment critiques each of the three
adverse employment action standards currently in use.
II. WEIGHTED IN THE EMPLOYEE'S FAVOR: THE MOST LENIENT
ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION STANDARD
The most lenient adverse employment action standard is weighted too
heavily in the employee's favor, and the price of wide-ranging employee
protection from Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation is high in terms
of litigation costs and overbroad employer liability. This Part critically
evaluates the First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits'
liberal adverse employment action standard.
A. The Most Lenient Standard's Pros
1. A Flexible Standard
The most lenient adverse employment action standard offers the
broadest range of Title VII protections to plaintiff employees that have
been impermissibly retaliated against. Operating on a case-by-case basis,
the most lenient adverse employment action standard recognizes that
employer retaliation surfaces in varied forms: "In the most liberal...
jurisdictions, the rulings reflect that [Title VII] does not define a rigid
'laundry list' of adverse actions precisely because retaliation can take
diverse and creative forms. ' 4 Defining employer retaliation broadly, the
"liberal definition of adverse employment action... suits [Title VII's] goal
of encouraging employees to bring sexual harassment complaints [(as well
as other Title VII discrimination complaints)] to the attention of their
employers" because it broadly protects employees engaged in Title VII-
protected activity from employer retaliation.25
The most lenient circuits evaluate alleged adverse employment actions
on a case-by-case basis, 26 and their fact-intensive inquiries have led to
24. Margery Corbin Eddy, Note, Finding the Appropriate Standard for Employer
Liability in Title VII Retaliation Cases: An Examination of the Applicability of Sexual
Harassment Paradigms, 63 ALB. L. REv. 361, 374 (1999).
25. Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regarding
Retaliation Under the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 553,
565.
26. See Timothy H. Madden, Note, Adverse Employment Actions: The Wisdom of
EEOC Guidance, 54 RUTGERS L. REv. 739, 745 (2002) ("The majority of the Circuit Courts
of Appeal interpret whether an action taken by an employer is actionable on a case-by-case
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employer liability in a wide variety of contexts.27 Under the most lenient
adverse employment action stafidard, "Section 2000e-3 encompasses a
variety of adverse employment actions, including demotions,
disadvantageous transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted
negative job evaluations, and toleration of harassment by other
employees. ' 28 Lenient circuits identify "actionable retaliation" claims by
asking "whether the [retaliatory] actions complained of were likely to deter
the charging party or others from engaging in activity protected by Title
VII. ' ' 29 In addition to ultimate employment decisions like hirings, firings,
promotions, and changes in compensation, lenient circuits may find adverse
employment actions in the following two types of cases:
([1]) cases in which an employee is discriminated against by a
nominally neutral act which actually significantly reduces an
employee's career prospects; and ([2]) cases in which an
employee is discriminatorily subjected to a humiliating,
degrading, unsafe, unhealthful, or otherwise significantly
negative workplace environment, one that can fairly be
characterized as an objective hardship.3 °
The most lenient adverse employment action standard is also the most
flexible, giving plaintiff employees wide-ranging protections from Title
VII-prohibited adverse employment actions.
2. Broadly Interprets the Term "Employee"
Not only do the liberal circuits provide employees with wide-ranging
protections from retaliatory adverse employment actions, but they also
interpret the term "employee" broadly because "[a] statute which is
remedial in nature [like Title VII] should be liberally construed."
31 Liberal
circuits extend Title VII protections to both current and former plaintiff
employees. 3' As the Tenth Circuit explained, "[iut would be illogical to
basis.").
27. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 7-12. See also Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll.,
152 F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that "an employer can ... be liable for co-
worker[] retaliatory harassment where its supervisory or management personnel either (1)
orchestrate the harassment or (2) know about the harassment and acquiesce in it in such a
manner as to condone and encourage the co-workers' actions.").
28. Hemandez-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 1998).
29. Johnson v. Milwaukee Sch. of Eng'g, 258 F. Supp. 2d 896, 907 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
30. Id. at 908.
31. Rutherford v. Am. Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162, 1165 (10th Cir. 1977).
32. See, e.g., Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding
that "the filing of [criminal] charges against a former employee may constitute adverse
action."); Rutherford, 565 F.2d at 1165-66 (affirming judgment in favor of the defendant
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define a[n] . . . employee [covered by Title VII's protections against
impermissible employer retaliation] liberally to include former employees
and to simultaneously define an adverse employment action narrowly by
limiting it to those formal practices linked to an existing
employee/employer relationship. 33 The liberal understanding of adverse
employment actions and the liberal understanding of employees covered by
Title VII's protections are consistent with one another.34
Protecting former employees from Title VII-prohibited employer
retaliation makes sense. Title VH's anti-employer-retaliation provision
was enacted to ensure that employees are able to take action against
discrimination in their workplaces, and protecting former employees is
consistent with that goal.35  Courts should prohibit post-employment
adverse employment actions in order to prevent a chilling effect on Title
VII-protected activities.
The most lenient adverse employment action standard is the best of
the three adverse employment action standards for plaintiff employees
because it is flexible and broad, offering the most protection to the broadest
range of individuals.
B. The Most Lenient Standard's Cons
While the most lenient adverse employment action standard offers a
broad range of protections to a broad range of Title VII plaintiff employees,
employers bear the costs in terms of far-reaching liability and an unclear
standard.
Although "[t]he courts that have adopted the more liberal standard
have done so cautiously, acknowledging the legitimate concerns of the
more conservative circuits and management in general, 36 the case-by-case
analysis required by the most lenient adverse employment action standard
employer's former employee because the defendant employer wrote a retaliatory letter that
cost the plaintiff employee another job).
33. Berry, 74 F.3d at 986.
34. All that is typically required to establish an adverse employment action against a
former employee is "a nexus between the action of the employer and the plaintiffs present
or future employment opportunities." Eddy, supra note 24, at 374. See also Melissa A.
Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under Title VII, the ADEA, and the
ADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers, Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. REv.
115, 139-40 (1998) (describing the liberal circuits' approach to determining when former
employers can be held liable for adverse employment actions).
35. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that former
employees are covered under Title VII's anti-retaliation provision because "a primary
purpose of anti[-]retaliation provisions [is m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms.").
36. Eddy, supra note 24, at 377.
2005] UNBALANCED RESPONSES TO EMPLOYERS GETTING EVEN 999
can still lead to confusion.37  The Seventh Circuit's attempt to
simultaneously include "conduct beyond 'quantifiable losses"' in its
adverse employment action standard and exclude "humiliation, lateral
transfers, and other actions... revealed upon analysis to be 'minor and
even trivial"' 3 8 risks, at best, an unclear standard and, at worst, frivolous
litigation:
the courts are not vested with the right, nor do they possess either
the time or the resources, to micromanage every employer that
falls within the scope of the employment discrimination laws.
Any attempt to perform such an onerous task will result in the
further loss of serious complaints among the trivial.3 9
Since the standard is so broad, nearly every Title VI-prohibited retaliation
claim requires a court's case-specific analysis, a costly prospect for
employers burdened with an unclear standard of liability.
The vague standard "imposes an unreasonable burden upon
employers., 40 Lacking a "substantive, bright-line measure against which
an employer can asses [its] actions," the most lenient adverse employment
action standard "throws employers into the dark where they can only guess
about which areas of prevention demand their attention.'"' Moreover, the
standard's imprecision combined with its case-by-case analysis unfairly
burdens employers who would otherwise make a good-faith effort to avoid
liability because those employers cannot match up their employment
policies with clear guidelines-indeed, no clear guidelines exist.
The most lenient adverse employment action standard's greatest
advantage, flexibility, is also its greatest disadvantage. Of the three
37. See, e.g., Sefiane v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 00-592-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
5614, at *18 (D.N.H. Mar. 27, 2002) (noting that "while the First Circuit has determined
that adverse employment actions include 'disadvantageous transfers or assignments,' it has
provided no guidance as to when a transfer may be considered disadvantageous so as to
constitute evidence of retaliation.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
38. Eddy, supra note 24, at 377 (emphasis added) (quoting Smart v. Ball State Univ.,
89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)) (arguing in favor of the Seventh Circuit's approach).
39. Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses? Unlawful
Retaliation Under Title VII Following Mattern: Will Courts Know It When They See It?, 14
LAB. LAW. 373, 410 (1998). See also Cathy Currie, Case Note, Staying on the Straighter
and Narrower: A Criticism of the Court's Definition of Adverse Employment Action Under
the Retaliation Provision of Title VII-Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000), 43
S. TEX. L. REV. 1323, 1340 (2002) ("A recent EEOC report stated that, 'nationally,
retaliation claims have nearly doubled in eight years .... ' In light of these alarming
statistics, the likelihood that serious retaliation claims are being lost in a myriad of trivial
claims is significant.").
40. Currie, supra note 39, at 1325 (criticizing the most lenient adverse employment
action standard and advocating a more moderate approach).
41. Id. at 1339.
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adverse employment action standards, the most lenient is the worst for
defendant employers because it imposes broad employer liability with little
guidance as to what adverse employment actions will trigger that liability.
C. Conclusion
The balance that the most lenient adverse employment action standard
strikes between Title VII employee protections and employer liability is
weighted in favor of Title VII employee protections. Since so many
individuals are protected from such a wide range of adverse employment
actions under the lenient standard, it is difficult for an employer to know
whether or not an employment action will be interpreted as adverse. The
most lenient adverse employment action standard is not the best standard
because it is overbroad and unclear, as well as impractical for employers
shaping their workplace policies. Moreover, the most lenient adverse
employment action standard is also potentially the most costly in terms of
litigation because its breadth requires the most searching inquiries into each
retaliation case.
III. WEIGHTED IN THE EMPLOYER'S FAVOR: THE MOST RESTRICTIVE
ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION STANDARD
The most restrictive adverse employment action standard is weighted
too heavily in the employer's favor-it does not provide Title VII-
protected employees enough protection from employer retaliation. The
most restrictive adverse employment action standard sacrifices important
Title VII protections in favor of a clear liability standard. This Part
critically evaluates the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits' strict adverse
employment action standard.
A. The Most Restrictive Standard's Pros
1. A Clear Standard
Under the most restrictive adverse employment action standard,
adverse employment actions that will sustain a plaintiff employee's prima
facie case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation are clear. The
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits hold that "Title VII addresses only
ultimate employment decisions, not 'every decision made by employers
that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate
decisions.' ,,42  Moreover, ultimate "employment actions such as
42. Id. at 1334 (quoting Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995)).
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termination or reductions in pay are required to support a finding of
employer retaliation."43 Since the standard is so strict, it is relatively easy
for employers to gauge when they may be held liable for retaliating against
Title VII-protected employees, making it easier for employers to craft
employment policies consistent with the law.44
2. Reduced Litigation Costs
The most restrictive adverse employment action standard reduces
litigation costs because there is no need to analyze employer conduct on a
case-by-case basis-the most restrictive standard is much less ambiguous
than the most lenient standard. More cases of alleged Title VII-prohibited
employer retaliation can be disposed of with summary judgment under the
most restrictive standard than under the most lenient standard. In Wideman
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., decided under the most lenient adverse
employment action standard, the plaintiff employee made out a prima facie
case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation with evidence including
work schedule changes and negative treatment at work.45 Since the
plaintiff employee presented evidence that she was treated differently at
work, she "satisfied the adverse employment action requirement for a
prima facie case of retaliation. 46 Although the Eleventh Circuit did "not
doubt that there is some threshold level of substantiality that must be met
for unlawful discrimination to be cognizable under the anti-retaliation
clause, [it did] not determine... the exact notch into which the bar should
be placed., 47 The most lenient adverse employment action standard pushes
more cases to trial because it is broad and "threshold level[s] of
substantiality" are unclear.48
In Pueschel v. Slater, the plaintiff employee, unlike the plaintiff
employee in Wideman, was unable to establish the second prong of her
prima facie case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation with evidence
of a proposed work schedule change.4 9 Pueschel held that a proposed
change to the plaintiff employee's "work schedule was neither a significant
change to her employment status, nor was it an adverse personnel action."50
43. Id.
44. Cf Cude & Steger, supra note 39, at 407-10 (arguing that "the courts are not, were
not intended to be, and should not become, personnel managers overseeing the day-to-day
affairs of American businesses.").
45. 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Pueschel v. Slater, No. 97-2503, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 2467, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb.
18, 1999).
50. Id.
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Only ultimate employment decisions sustain a Title VII plaintiff
employee's retaliation claim in the most restrictive circuits. Employment
actions insufficiently adverse to establish a prima facie case in the most
restrictive circuits include-but are not limited to-lateral transfers, 51 co-
worker harassment, 2 changed salary structures,53 poor performance
evaluations, 54 and unjust public criticisms.55 Since these same employment
actions may constitute actionable Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation
in the most lenient circuits,56 fewer types of retaliation cases go to trial in
the most restrictive circuits than in the most lenient circuits.
The most restrictive adverse employment action standard is the best of
the three adverse employment action standards for the defendant employer
because it is strict and narrow. It limits an employer's liability and gives an
employer a clear standard compatible with setting employment policies
consistent with the law. Moreover, the most restrictive adverse
employment action standard also conserves judicial resources because
fewer types of cases go to trial under the most restrictive standard than
51. See, e.g., Burger v. Cent. Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 1999)
("Refusing an employee's request for a purely lateral transfer does not qualify as an ultimate
employment decision."). But cf., e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir.
1994) (noting that "employer actions such as... disadvantageous transfers or assignments"
may constitute adverse employment actions).
52. See, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997)
("Hostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety, without more,
do not constitute ultimate employment decisions, and therefore are not the required adverse
employment actions."). But see, e.g., Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253,
1265 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that "an employer can.., be liable for co-worker[]
retaliatory harassment"); Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-16 (noting that "employer actions such as...
toleration of harassment by other employees" may constitute adverse employment actions).
53. See, e.g., Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir.
2003) ("[T]he [employer]'s implementation of... its new salary structure ... did not
amount to an ultimate employment decision under Title VII."). But cf, e.g., Corneveaux v.
CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff
employee "met the second step [in proving her prima facie case of retaliation] by showing
that shortly after she filed the charge against [her employer] it required her to go through
several hoops in order to obtain her severance benefits.").
54. See, e.g., Kang v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 75 Fed. Appx. 974, 976
(5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the plaintiff employee's "proposition that his.., complaint-that
he received a poor performance evaluation--qualifies as an adverse employment
decision."). But see Wyatt, 35 F.3d at 15-16 (noting that "employer actions such as...
unwarranted negative job evaluations" may constitute adverse employment actions).
55. See, e.g., Kang, 75 Fed. Appx. at 976 (rejecting the plaintiff employee's proposition
that his employer's unjust criticism of him in front of his peers at a meeting constitutes an
adverse employment action "because of [its] lack of consequence"). But cf., e.g., Passer v.
Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that the defendant
employer's cancellation of a public event honoring the plaintiff employee was an adverse
employment action).
56. See cases cited supra notes 51-55.
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under any other standard.
B. The Most Restrictive Standard's Cons
1. Restricted Protections
While the most restrictive adverse employment action standard offers
a clear standard of employer liability, the plaintiff employees that Title VII
was crafted to protect bear the costs. Since only ultimate employment
actions trigger employer liability under the most restrictive adverse
employment action standard, "the [strictest circuits] are sending the
message that it is acceptable to retaliate against employees who have filed
discrimination claims, as long as that retaliation ... falls short of an
ultimate employment action."57 Colorable claims of discrimination may be
dismissed under the most restrictive adverse employment action standard
because the "ultimate employment action" standard is "outcome
determinative, resulting in the dismissal of a great number of 'actionable'
claims., 58 Many viable cases may "never reach a trier of fact" under the
most restrictive adverse employment action standard. 59
Under the most restrictive adverse employment action standard, Title
VII-protected employees must show that they have suffered from an
ultimate adverse employment decision before they can establish a prima
facie case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation; consequently, they
are vulnerable to all adverse employment decisions that fall short of
ultimate adverse employment decisions. Kang v. Board of Supervisors of
Louisiana State University illustrates the weaknesses of this over-strict
standard.6 ° In Kang, the plaintiff employee filed an Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) complaint "alleging that [his employer]
had [racially] discriminated against him when it rejected his [job]
application.,,6' The plaintiff employee's employer allegedly retaliated by
giving him a "poor performance evaluation[,] ... failing to nominate him
for a teaching award, unjustly criticizing him in front of his peers . . . ,and
57. Madden, supra note 26, at 758.
58. Eddy, supra note 24, at 378 ("An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a
victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with
immediate (or successively higher) authority over the employee [even] when no tangible
employment action is taken.") (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Burlington
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998)). For examples of claims rejected under the
most restrictive standard that are actionable under the most lenient standard, see cases cited
supra notes 51-55.
59. Id. at 378.
60. 75 Fed. Appx. 974 (5th Cir. 2003). For other examples of the most restrictive
adverse employment action standard's weaknesses, see cases cited supra notes 16-18, 51-
55.
61. Kang, 75 Fed. Appx. at 975.
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writing him up for not keeping his research area clean., 62 The Fifth Circuit
held that "none of the actions that [the plaintiff employee] complain[ed] of,
even if true, qualifjied] as 'ultimate employment decisions.' 63  Kang
illustrates the most restrictive standard's weakness-inflexibility-because
if the plaintiff employee's allegations were true, his employer likely
retaliated against him for filing an EEOC complaint. And while the
plaintiff employee was not fired or demoted in Kang, his employer brought
its power to bear in order to both make his work environment
uncomfortable and deter his Title VII-protected activities. An employer's
intentional, malicious, and retaliatory adverse employment actions are
likely to have a chilling effect on Title VII-protected employee speech;
consequently, they ought to be prohibited by the Act.
2. Restricted Interpretation of Title VII's Applicability
Not only do the strictest circuits provide employees only narrowly
defined protections from adverse employment actions, but in the past they
have also tried to interpret the term "employee" narrowly because:
Given the types of practices that Title VII forbids, it follows that
Congress drew the line defining the scope of Title VII at its most
logical place-the termination of the employment relationship.
Title VII does not redress discriminatory practices, however
reprehensible, which occur after the employment relationship has
ended.64
Shell Oil Co. read Title VII's anti-retaliation provision as applying only to
"applicants/employees falling victim to discrimination during their
applications for employment and/or employment.', 65 Acknowledging that
its holding was "at odds with the majority of circuit courts that have
addressed" the question of whether or not former employees are covered by
Title VII's protections, Shell Oil Co. nevertheless denied a former
employee redress from Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation.
66
The Supreme Court reversed Shell Oil Co. because "being more
consistent with the broader context of Title VII and the primary purpose of
§ 704(a) .... former employees are included within § 704(a)'s coverage.' 67
62. Id. at 976.
63. Id.
64. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 331 (4th Cir. 1995), aff'g No. 93-1562,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 11925 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 1995), rev'd, 519 U.S. 337 (1997).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.. 519 U.S. 337. 346 (1997).
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Denying former employees protection from Title VII-prohibited employer
retaliation does not make sense. Title VII's anti-employer-retaliation
provision was enacted to ensure that employees are able to take action
against discrimination in their workplaces, and not protecting former
employees from retaliation is inconsistent with Title VII's goals.
The most restrictive adverse employment action standard's greatest
advantage, clarity, is also its greatest disadvantage because inflexibility is
its price. Of the three adverse employment action standards, the most
restrictive is the worst for Title VII-protected plaintiff employees because
it leaves them vulnerable to tangible retaliatory adverse employment
actions so long as the actions fall short of ultimate employment decisions.
C. Conclusion
The balance that the most restrictive adverse employment action
standard strikes between clear employer liability standards and Title VII
employee protections is weighted in favor of clear liability standards.
Since so few individuals are protected from such a narrow range of adverse
employment actions, it is difficult for an employee to establish a prima
facie case of Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation. The most
restrictive adverse employment action standard is not the best standard
because it is so strict that it risks a chilling effect on the types of activities
that Title VII was designed to encourage and protect.
IV. OFF BALANCE: THE INTERMEDIATE ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION
STANDARD
The balance that the intermediate adverse employment action standard
strikes between employee protection against Title VII-prohibited employer
retaliation and a clear liability standard could be improved with increased
employee protections and a clearer standard. This Part critically evaluates
the Second and Third Circuits' intermediate adverse employment action
standard.
A. The Intermediate Standard's Pros
1. Requires a "Materially Adverse Change"
Under the intermediate adverse employment action standard, courts
attempt to strike a balance between employee protection and an appropriate
level of employer liability by requiring plaintiff employees to establish a
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"'materially adverse change' in [their] working conditions. 68  In
intermediate circuits, plaintiff employees must show "some material
affectation of a term or condition of employment in order to" establish the
second prong of their prima facie cases of Title VII-prohibited employer
retaliation.69  The balance that the intermediate circuits strike is an
attempted "middle ground" between the most lenient and the most
restrictive adverse employment action standards that (1) "[b]ar[s]
employees from bringing a retaliatory suit based on trivial adverse
employment actions,"70 (2) "allows employers to focus on eradicating
discrimination within the workplace rather than spending their resources
defending suits" over matters best dealt with internally, 7' and (3) offers
more employee protection than the most restrictive adverse employment
action standard.
2. Protects a Broader Class of Plaintiff Employees
Plaintiff employees do not have to suffer from an ultimate adverse
employment action in order to establish a prima facie case of Title VII-
prohibited employer retaliation under the intermediate standard. Under the
intermediate standard:
an "adverse employment action" constitutes a "materially adverse
change" in the employee's working conditions, such as
termination, demotion, or a reduction in wages or benefits.
"[L]ess flagrant reprisals by employers may [also] be adverse."
Because there are no bright-line rules as to which employment
actions meet the threshold for "adverse," courts must make this
determination on a case-by-case basis.72
Retaliatory employer actions that fall short of ultimate employment
decisions can qualify as Title VII-prohibited adverse employment actions
under the intermediate adverse employment action standard; consequently,
68. Jordan v. Cayuga County, No. 5:01-CV-1037, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1666, at *19
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2004) (citation omitted).
69. Wendy Hyland, Note, Equal Opportunity for Employers: Elevating the Adverse
Employment Action Standard to Allow Only Meritorious Retaliation Claims, 90 KY. L.J.
273, 282 (2001-2002).
70. Id. at 292.
7 1. Id. at 292-93. Hyland argues that "[b]y refusing to recognize behavior too remote
from any connection to the employee's job as retaliatory, the intermediate standard best
helps courts to draw the line on liability for adverse employment action by protecting both
employers and employees." Id. at 293.
72. Wilburn v. Fleet Fin. Group, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 2d 219, 236-37 (D. Conn. 2001)
(alterations in original) (citations omitted).
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a broader class of plaintiff employees is protected under the intermediate
standard than under the most restrictive standard. Plaintiff employees
covered under the intermediate standard but vulnerable under the most
restrictive standard include-but are not limited to--those employees who
have suffered from "unchecked retaliatory co-worker harassment
' 73 and
internal transfers.74
The intermediate adverse employment action standard attempts to
reconcile the needs of plaintiff employees who have engaged in Title VII-
protected activities with the needs of defendant employers. It sets up a
clearer liability framework than the most lenient standard by only holding
employers liable for retaliatory actions that materially affect either a term
or condition of their Title VII-protected plaintiff employee's work. Also, it
protects a broader class of plaintiff employees than the most restrictive
standard by rejecting the "ultimate employment decision" test.
B. The Intermediate Standard's Cons
1. May Leave Title VII-Protected Plaintiffs Vulnerable to Employer
Retaliation
Under the intermediate adverse employment action standard, courts
dismiss Title VII retaliation suits that the most lenient circuits allow-for
example, fact-intensive cases dismissed at the summary judgment phase
under the intermediate standard may proceed to trial under the most lenient
standard.75  Employers are free to retaliate against Title VII-protected
73. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999).
Richardson noted that a plaintiff can establish the second prong of his or her prima facie
case of Title VI-prohibited employer retaliation with evidence of co-worker harassment so
long as his or her employer was "negligent, that is, if it either 'provided no reasonable
avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it."' Id. at 441. But
see, e.g., Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that co-
worker hostility does not establish the second prong of a plaintiff employee's prima facie
case of Title VI-prohibited employer retaliation).
74. See, e.g., Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 144 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that "[a]n
internal transfer can be an adverse employment action if 'accompanied by a negative change
in the terms and conditions of employment."') (quoting Morris v. Lindau, 196 F.3d 102, 113
(2d Cir. 1999)); Richardson, 180 F.3d at 444 (holding that the plaintiff employee
sufficiently alleged an adverse employment action because the defendant employer may
have transferred her to a different position "in the hopes that she would quit"). But see, e.g.,
Duhe v. United States Postal Serv., No. 03-746, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3737, at *37 n.50
(E.D. La. Mar. 9, 2004) (noting that "a purely lateral transfer does not constitute an
'ultimate employment decision' because it is not a "tangible employment action").
75. See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1301 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that "'unsubstantiated oral reprimands' and 'unnecessary derogatory
comments' . . . do not rise to the level of 'adverse employment action"'). But cf, e.g.,
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plaintiff employees under the intermediate standard as long as their
retaliatory actions are not materially adverse to the plaintiff employees'
working conditions. In Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, a defendant
employer was not liable for Title VII-prohibited retaliation when it did
nothing about a supervisor's unsubstantiated oral reprimands and
derogatory comments directed towards a Title VII-protected plaintiff
employee.76 City of Pittsburgh illustrates the need for a broader scope of
plaintiff employee protection because both the reprimands and derogatory
comments of supervisors-particularly when they occur together-could
deter potential Title VII plaintiffs from making Title VII complaints.
2. An Unclear Standard
Although the intermediate adverse employment action standard adds a
hoop that plaintiff employees must jump through in order to establish the
second prong of their prima facie cases of Title V1I-prohibited employer
retaliation, the standard does not provide much guidance to courts,
employers, or plaintiff employees. The intermediate standard ensures that"a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities" will not
suffice to establish the second prong of a plaintiff employee's prima facie
case of Title V1I-prohibited employer retaliation,77 but it leaves two
questions unresolved: (1) what actions will suffice to establish the second
prong of a plaintiff employee's prima facie case of Title VI-prohibited
employer retaliation? and (2) what is the best way to measure the impact of
an employer's retaliatory actions?
The following guide is of little help: "To prove retaliation other than
through... 'classic' examples, the plaintiff must demonstrate, 'using an
objective standard,' that 'the total circumstances of [his] working
environment changed to become unreasonably inferior and adverse when
compared to a typical or normal, not ideal or model, workplace."" Terms
like "typical" and "normal" are relative and render the intermediate
standard unclear. Moreover, "[b]ecause there are no bright line rules,"
intermediate circuits must "examine retaliation claims case-by-case to
determine whether the challenged actions were 'adverse'. ."..,
Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1994) (noting that "employer actions
such as... unwarranted negative job evaluations" may constitute adverse employment
actions).
76. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d at 1301.
77. Weeks v. New York State, 273 F.3d 76, 85 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
78. Alban-Davies v. Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA) Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6150, 2002 U.-S.
Dist. LEXIS 5261, at * 15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips
v. Bowen, 278 F.3d 103, 109 (2d Cir. 2002)). "Classic" examples of retaliation are ultimate
employment decisions.
79. Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 70 Fed. Appx. 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
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The intermediate adverse employment action standard leaves plaintiff
employees vulnerable to retaliatory actions that may deter Title VII-
protected activity. Moreover, the intermediate standard is unclear because
it requires a case-by-case analysis that weighs at-issue employment
conditions against a "normal" workplace environment that is difficult-if
not impossible-to define.
C. Conclusion
The intermediate adverse employment action standard is neither
effectively clearer than the most lenient standard nor sufficiently broader
than the most restrictive standard. The intermediate standard is unclear.
Although the intermediate standard only holds employers liable for
retaliatory actions that materially affect either a term or condition of their
Title VI-protected plaintiff employees' work, it is unclear what actions
materially affect either a term or condition of work. The intermediate
standard is also too narrow because it does not apply to all adverse
employment actions that deter Title V1I-protected activities.
V. STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE ADVERSE
EMPLOYMENT ACTION STANDARD
A. The Proposed Standard
The proposed adverse employment action standard has three parts.
First, all ultimate employment decisions establish the second prong of a
plaintiff employee's prima facie case of Title VI-prohibited employer
retaliation. Second, adverse employment decisions that fall short of
ultimate employment decisions are examined on a case-by-case, sliding
scale basis. On the sliding scale, the severity of an employer's retaliatory
action is on one axis, and the likelihood that an employer's retaliatory
action will deter Title VI-protected activity is on the other axis. The two
factors are inversely proportional-the more severe an employer's
retaliatory action is, the less likely it has to be that the action could deter a
plaintiff employee's Title VI-protected activity, and vice versa. Finally,
co-worker harassment will establish the second prong of a plaintiff
employee's prima facie case only when the employer was both aware of
and complicit in the harassment.
This Comment's proposed adverse employment action standard
combines elements of the three adverse employment action standards
currently in use. Under the proposed adverse employment action standard,
as under each of the three existing standards, ultimate employment
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decisions such as hirings, firings, promotions, and changes in compensation
qualify as adverse employment actions.80 Like the most lenient adverse
employment action standard, the proposed standard is flexible enough to
protect employees engaged in Title VII-protected activity from employer
retaliation in a wide variety of contexts. Like the intermediate adverse
employment action standard, non-ultimate-employment-decision adverse
employment actions must meet certain requirements in order to support the
second prong of a prima facie case of retaliation.
This Comment's proposed adverse employment action standard also
departs from the three adverse employment action standards currently in
use. The proposed standard is slightly broader than the intermediate
standard because it would send cases like Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh81
to trial under its sliding scale analysis. It is also slightly narrower than the
intermediate standard because it employs a knowing-not "negligent ' ' 82
requirement for co-worker harassment claims. Compared with the most
lenient standard, the proposed standard is narrower because it focuses
courts' case-by-case inquiries by using a sliding scale guide.
B. The Proposed Standard's Pros
Ultimately, the proposed standard is (1) consistent with Title VIl's
purpose, (2) easier for employers to construct their employment policies
around than the most lenient adverse employment action standard, and (3)
more protective of the employee rights that Title VII was designed to
protect than the intermediate standard.
1. Consistent with Title VII's Purpose
Title VII protects employees who "oppose[] any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by" Title VII and employees who make "a
charge, testif[y], assist[], or participate[] in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under" Title VII.83  Protecting employees from
retaliation is consistent with Title VII's purpose because the act is remedial
in nature, and "a primary purpose of anti[-]retaliation provisions [is
m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms."84 Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision should prevent employers from retaliating
against plaintiff employees who make Title VII complaints with the goal of
deterring those complaints-employers should be held liable for adverse
80. See cases cited supra notes 13, 19, 23 and accompanying text.
81. 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
82. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
84. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
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employment actions that fall short of ultimate employment decisions when
the goal of such actions is to interfere with a plaintiff employee's Title VII
rights.
2. Appropriate Level of Employer Liability
The proposed standard uses a sliding scale in order to give employers
an idea of what is at stake in retaliation cases and to maintain flexibility.
Although employers may prefer a clearer standard, an absolute standard
like the most restrictive standard is incompatible with retaliation's varied
forms. The proposed standard balances an employer's need for guidelines
around which it can shape its employment policies and an employee's need
for protection against Title VII-prohibited employer retaliation. The
proposed standard also incorporates a knowing requirement for co-worker
harassment claims because retaliation ought to be fairly attributable to an
employer in order to sustain a prima facie case of Title VII-prohibited
employer retaliation.
3. Appropriate Level of Employee Protection
The proposed standard is more flexible than the intermediate standard
because it replaces the materially adverse requirement with a sliding scale
guide. The sliding scale shifts the focus to the objective deterrent effect of
the employer's action in order to reach cases like Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh.8" At the same time, the proposed standard is less flexible than
the most lenient standard because the most lenient standard provides too
little guidance to courts that are inundated with Title VII 
retaliation cases. 86
VI. CONCLUSION
The three-way circuit split as to what constitutes an adverse
employment action sufficient to sustain a Title V1I-prohibited employer
retaliation case puts Title VI-protected plaintiff employees in a precarious
position that is at odds with Title VII's fundamental purpose-protecting
employees engaged in equal employment opportunity proceedings or
activities from employer retaliation. The success of a Title VII-protected
plaintiff employee's claim should not depend on his or her judicial
jurisdiction. Moreover, the circuit split makes it difficult for multi-state
employers to craft their employment policies according to the law.
85. 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997).
86. See Currie, supra note 39, at 1340 (noting the proliferation of retaliation claims and
discussing the need for a clear standard to guide courts and employers in distinguishing
trivial cases from legitimate cases).
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A critical evaluation of the three adverse employment action standards
reveals strengths and weaknesses in each standard. This Comment's
proposed solution, an adverse employment action standard that premises an
employer's liability on its fault and knowledge in addition to its actions,
resolves some of the problems of the standards currently in use. The
proposed standard is (1) easier for employers to construct their employment
policies around than the most lenient standard, (2) more protective of the
employee rights that Title VII was designed to protect than the intermediate
and most restrictive standards, and (3) consistent with Title VII's purpose.
